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THOUGHTS

ON THE

DEATH

OF THE

KING of FRANCE.

By WILLIAM FOX.

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L O N D O N :

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THE melancholy catastrophe of the king of France, and the horror it has excited in this country, call for investigation; because consequences of great importance seem likely to result from it, and, in proportion as these consequences may be important, it is requisite that the investigation should be cool and unimpassioned. Even in the ordinary situations, and common occurrences of human life, great is the risk and danger of giving up our conduct to the guidance, even of those passions, which, when under the guidance and control of reason, are valuable and amiable. The human passions may properly give energy to our actions, when reason has marked out their course, and fixed their boundaries; but, without these precautions, they are dangerous in the extreme; nor can any action, resulting merely from our passions, be denominated virtuous or moral, any more than the fidelity of a dog, the harmlessness of a sheep, or the attachment of a dove.

If we extend our views from common life, to the more enlarged sphere of human action, which history presents to our view, we shall find the most enormous evils, arose from the dictates of reason being overborn by the fervor of the passions, under whose fallacious colouring men have supposed themselves to be in the path of duty, while they have been outraging every moral principle, and trampling on every duty of social life. Under the impression of heroism and patriotism, what dreadful mischiefs have pervaded every age of the world! and an imagination inflamed with an idea of advancing God's glory, has been productive of no less dreadful consequences; not much inferior have been those which have resulted from a desire of avenging the real or imaginary wrongs of individuals: Nor is this principle confined to the annals of chivalry; it disgraces the page of history. For upwards of a century this nation was deluged in blood, by the partizans of the claimants of the crown; and in the present century we have had two civil wars, to avenge the injuries, and redress the wrongs of the house of Stuart.

Thus have we experienced the mischiefs of this principle, of which the danger is the greater, as it assumes the guise of justice and humanity. Were we merely to accompany with a look of pity, and the sigh of commiseration, the unfortunate Bourbons, or the still more unfortunate Stuarts; it might not be necessary accurately to investigate the foundation of our pity, or to be very solicitous exactly to apportion it. If it tends to meliorate our minds by contemplating human woe, or, to improve them by reflection on the uncertainty of human felicity, no harm would result, though our sorrow should border on excess: nor may it be requisite in such case, to be very anxious to bring our feelings to the bar of reason. But if the profligate and designing attempt to take advantage of human frailty; if they excite our pity that they may work it into rage; if they attempt to suffuse our eyes in tears, that they may lead us blindly, to perpetrate greater mischiefs than those they affect to deplore; it will then become us to give firmness to our nerves, to repress our feelings, and to call upon reason to resume her throne. She will tell us, that the continuance both of moral and physical evil in the world, is the will of him who made it; and that the cognizance of human actions, as to their moral nature, belongs to him who will in due time render to every man according to his works; that man can have no authority to punish his fellow mortals, but what is derived from the will, either express, or implied of their common parent. Hence it appears that *that* degree and species of authority is to be exercised among men united in social compact, which the preservation of that compact requires; and in the several relations of life that which those special relations call for. But in none of those cases cognizance is taken of the action abstractedly, as to its moral turpitude, but merely in reference to the relation between man and man; if we presume to go beyond this, we are trampling on the authority of him, who, speaking of the good and evil in this world, decreed, "let them grow together till the harvest."

This principle is actually recognized by the general structure of our criminal code, which forbears to take notice of many offences, though of a very criminal nature. A man may suffer even his parent to perish

for want; and though, in this and a variety of instances, he might be guilty of an atrocious murder, the law will take no notice of it. Perjury, if unaccompanied with any injury to society; and even adultery and seduction, though attended with circumstances which might constitute the climax of human guilt, are totally unnoticed by our criminal law. As thus the most enormous crimes are suffered to go unpunished; so actions not merely of trivial guilt, but which result from good and amiable dispositions, if deemed injurious to society, are punished with severity. The *Grecian Daughter*, for obstructing the execution of a legal sentence, must have been deemed guilty of a crime, by every well constituted system of law. And it is not only in annexing punishment to crime, but in conducting the legal process that we lose sight of the moral turpitude of the offence. Thus we acquit the most notorious and well-known criminals, rather than violate those rules of evidence which we deem the good of society to require; nor is an individual suffered to inflict those punishments which the laws have annexed to crimes, however certain he may be of the criminal's guilt.

If then a state of civil compact, where mankind are connected by a recognized system of laws, enforced by the sanctions of government; where the crimes can be accurately defined, and the criminals discriminated and punished; the moral nature of human actions is thus disregarded, and they are not punished on the mere abstract principle of their moral turpitude; surely we are not on any such principle, to enter forcibly into other societies, to punish its members, either collectively or individually? Such a proceeding must necessarily be destitute of every proper principle, on which man can be authorised to take cognizance of the actions of his fellow creatures. There is no acknowledged system or laws to govern the conduct of nations in thus punishing each others crimes. The dissonance in the laws and customs of different nations, renders them very inadequate judges of each others proceedings; nor are there any means by which the nature of the offence can be properly estimated. The accused nation will not submit to plead to any foreign jurisdiction, they must therefore be condemned unheard. The French national

convention will be as little disposed to submit the justice of their revolution to the adjudication of the British court, as the English convention would in 1688 have been to have submitted that of the English revolution to the court of France. Such proceedings must be destitute of the semblance of justice; and those who have the government of nations so avowedly act on political motives, that, when others are pretended, it may reasonably be imagined that the view is to perpetrate crimes, under the pretence of punishing them. But, admitting the British court to be actuated by the purest motives;—admitting that Africa, the West-indies, the East-indies, and our Sister Kingdom were to bear a united testimony to the rectitude and beneficence of our conduct, that we never interfere in the concerns of other countries, but to promote their happiness, and secure their rights;—that our sword is the sword of justice, and not of outrage; and, that it never was unsheathed but to protect the innocent, and to punish the aggressor: yet, still might the propriety of our avenging the death of the king of France be doubted, because we have hardly the means of discriminating the guilty, or ascertaining their proportionate share in the guilt.

Political events are of so complicated a nature, and arise frequently from such contingencies, that to distinguish the respective shares of merit or demerit in the actors is usually very difficult, even to those who are actors in the scene, and most intimately acquainted with its conduct; and it must be peculiarly so, respecting the French revolution, from the various forms it has assumed, the variety of circumstances with which it has been attended, and the numerous actors who have taken part in it. Are we to punish the municipal officers who conducted the execution, or the individual members of the convention who voted it? Admitting the king to have committed no offence that deserved punishment; admitting our judgment on this head to be infallible; and admitting also that the majority of the national convention saw it in the same point of view; yet still we are inadequate judges how far they were voluntary actors in the scene, or how far they were impelled by circumstances; whether they were actuated

by malice or revenge, or whether, in a critical moment, and threatened with destruction by surrounding enemies, they might think it expedient to unite the nation, by removing the only source of discord that existed amongst them. If it be said that they ought to have rendered justice uninfluenced by popular clamour, let it be asked if the British parliament have always manifested such laudable firmness? Did they not avowedly to appease a popular clamour, repeal the Jew bill, and deprive of their acknowledged right, thousands of peaceable subjects? If it be said the French convention were not justified in punishing an individual, on the mere political principle, that the peace, the safety, and the good of the community called for it; may it not be demanded, for what offence the houses of Stuart and of Savoy were set aside by a British parliament? If attachment to the Romish see was their crime; of that crime was Louis equally guilty, and if the security of this island justified us in considering it as such, surely the national convention of France are equally justifiable in paying the same attention to the security, the peace, and the happiness of the first nation in the universe.

It is customary in this kingdom, to speak contemptuously of the national convention. I will so far comply with the fashion, as to acknowledge them to have been perfectly insignificant on this occasion. The municipal officers, who executed the sentence, and the national convention who decreed it, may be considered as the mere instruments, the accidental terminators of an event which resulted from a train of circumstances: and, in investigating those circumstances, we shall be far more likely to find the real criminals, than among the national convention, or the municipal officers. Mr. Burke, even in the early stages of the French revolution, confidently predicted a fatal catastrophe; this was certainly not very difficult for him to do with some degree of certainty. Jonathan Wild seldom failed in his predictions. Those who were not in the secret of the hostile measures, intended to be pursued, respecting the French revolution, could not, indeed, perceive any thing of a very king-killing aspect: not a single circumstance attending the establishment of the new government could be referred to, as containing the seeds of danger

to the royal person. To impose this on the public mind, the establishment of the new government, and the attempt to subvert it, must be confounded. The measures taken to effect the restoration of the old government, whether they succeeded, or whether they miscarried, not merely threatened, but insured destruction to the unfortunate monarch. The hostile armies gathering round, were the sure presages of his fate.

At that important and critical moment, the national assembly invoked our interference, and offered to submit to our mediation; an offer honorable to themselves! —honorable to us! They reposed a confidence in us, that, possessing a free government, we would not impose on them their antient despotism. And will not some be apt to imagine that this was the real reason that we refused our mediation? They will perhaps say that subverting the infant liberty of France and Poland, and establishing antient slavery, was an office more becoming German and Russian despots, than a British nation, and that it was more convenient that we should stand aloof, at least for the present. The Prussian, the Austrian, and the Russian armies might undertake the business; they possibly might effect it, as they have that of Poland, without our interference; if not, the contest might produce some event which would afford us a more colourable pretext for interfering, than the subversion of the liberties of France or Poland, or securing the despotism of Germany. Among these events, the most certain and the most desirable, must be the death of the king of France, by the hands of his enraged subjects. It is not easy to see how the hostile armies could enter France, with threatened destruction, but in the expectation of that event. The emigrant princes, the *cidevant* nobles, and the nonjuring clergy of France might say, The whole body of our countrymen are united in one firm phalanx, to resist those exclusive privileges we have so long enjoyed; and, however zealous the illustrious potentates of Russia, Prussia, and Austria may be to replace us in the possession of them, yet alas! it is an arduous undertaking, which it is possible our countrymen, united as one man against us, may successfully resist. In this situation, what can be more important to our cause? What could enliven our hopes so much,

as the court of Britain adopting our cause? If her armies are not considerable, her resources are great. She can supply the sinews of war. Her national credit, and her system of finance are of so peculiar a structure, that, were she to join cordially in our support, the war might be protracted to an extent, that would exhaust the resources of our countrymen, and they may at length, be necessitated to exchange the calamities of war for those we mean to impose upon them. But though the reception of our friend Calonne, at the British court, and tho' Mr. Burke's abuse of our adversaries, having there obliterated the remembrance of his panegyrics on republicanism, and his insults on royalty, are circumstances which may well warrant us to conclude that our friends are not limited to Germany and Russia; yet alas, in Britain liberty rears her head! There a swinish multitude influences public proceedings, and however cordially some personages may be inclined to support us, yet may they be fearful of doing it in opposition to the public voice. But could our countrymen be induced to destroy the king or queen, then indeed a sudden furor might be raised in the English nation, under cover of which our friends there might adopt our cause. The minister might be then persuaded to come down to the house, and tell them that the death of the king was "*The natural effect of the principles maintained in France,*" and that these principles "*Had brought to a fatal catastrophe a lawful sovereign.*" That "*they had shed the blood of their unfortunate monarch*" "*left the world should be at a loss to know the nature of their system,*" and he may then possibly be induced to call on the nation "*to arrest the progress of such principles, and prevent their contagion,*" Shall we then quietly submit to the limited monarchy now established? Shall we suffer the king, like the English monarchs, to obtain the love of the people, by willingly abandoning the ancient prerogatives of the crown, cheerfully acquiescing in the limited power assigned him, and exercising his *veto* in subservience to the public voice, content with the influence and importance he will derive from the immense civil list they have allotted him? Shall we suffer him, like the English queen Mary, to concur in the seizure of the temporalities of the clergy, of that

religion, to which, like her, he is attached? Or, shall we tempt him to unite his interest with ours, and, by holding out to him the hope of powerful foreign assistance, induce him to use the power still left in his hands? Our countrymen will suppose that the hostile armies invading and desolating France in his name, have his concurrence. The people will be enraged, a convention will take place, and thus the king must inevitably fall. This may induce the friends of a limited monarchy to strengthen our party; but, at all events, if the nation should still be united against us, and the invading armies should be repulsed, still the king being destroyed, and a democratic republic established, Mr. Burke and our other friends in England will thence be enabled to render our countrymen more generally odious to the English nation, than is possible while France continues a limited monarchy. Thus the death of the king will become the means of inducing the English, to engage in a war, to restore us to those riches and privileges, of which they have long since deprived their own nobility and clergy. The riches of England and Holland will then give energy to the operations of the great and illustrious monarchs of Russia, Prussia, and Austria. Shall we then hesitate to provoke our adversaries to embroil their hands in the blood of the king, and thus abandon for ever the only hope that now remains to us of restoring that antient, that venerable government, which, however odious it might be to the people, we contend, as we have good reason to contend, was most excellent and perfect?

Thus probably, on an accurate examination of the whole train of circumstances attending this event, we shall find a new order of criminals appear to our view, of a very different description from the national convention, the municipal officers, or the mob of Paris. And it will not be easy to procure the acquittal of those criminals before an impartial judicature, unless it can be shewn that the invasion of France, and the duke of Brunswick's manifesto were not such proceedings, as, in the common order of human events, might reasonably be expected to produce the death of the king.

But before we sit in judgment on the murderers of the king of France, whoever they may be, it is absolutely

requisite, for preserving the semblance of justice, that we should be certain that we ourselves are perfectly free from guilt. Here methinks a burst of indignation spreads, around me and all with one voice, exclaim, Do you charge us with the guilt of a deed which appears to have excited universal horror? And when our court has been cloathed in the ensigns of sorrow, and the semblance of woe,—But are not these proofs of innocence equivocal?—What vile slanderer! Can'st thou pretend that the British nation has taken any concern in these measures, which have brought the unhappy monarch to the scaffold? Did we interfere in the affairs of France, till that melancholy event took place? Did we not stand by, calm spectators of all these circumstances which produced the tremendous scene? It is true! And on this exculpatory defence I found my charge!—If a crime be about to be perpetrated, and we use not those endeavours in our power, and which we lawfully may, to prevent its commission, we become partners in the guilt. If we stand by while the deadly ingredients are preparing, and dash them not to the ground. If we see the Assassin uplift his poniard, and, though it be in our power, wrest it not from his hand, we become equally guilty, as if we administered the empoisoned draught, or plunged the murderous weapon.

With this indisputable position in our mind, let us review the circumstances. In doing this it will not be necessary to defend the French revolution in any respect. Admitting we perceived the government as formed by the constituting assembly, to contain in it the latent seeds of danger to the king.—That the embryo principles, which have since produced such deadly fruit, lay then open to our discriminating eye.—Let it then be considered, that this dangerous government was voluntarily submitted to our revisal. When the French nation proffered us the office of mediator, we could without violating the law of nations, without insulting the independency of a great nation, have then pointed out the defects in the new established government. We might then have advised the rooting out any germinating seeds of danger to the king, and the new formed government; our recommendation would have

come with propriety, for it was requested, our interference would then have had weight, for it was in a critical moment, when the limited monarchy was threatened from adverse quarters. On the one hand it was threatened with destruction by the invading armies in support of the antient despotism, and on the other by the powerful republican party, in opposition to whom the limited monarchy had been established. The friends of the then existing government would, doubtless, have been desirous to have listened to our friendly council, and then have guarded the state from those threatened dangers, and themselves from Prussian prisons. Enemies as they were to the antient despotism, yet were they anxious to support that limited authority of the monarch, which the constituting assembly had deemed expedient. But Mr. Pitt contends, that "by the law of nations, we have a right to interfere in the concerns of other countries, so far as to oblige them to establish a form of government and terminate anarchy." How stands the fact even compared with his own principle? France when threatened with invasion by the combined armies, was possessed of a government, which Mr. Pitt acknowledges to have had apparently the concurrence of the people. This government was threatened by a foreign force, and a domestic faction; the one would naturally operate to increase the other. At this critical period we are called on to mediate, to endeavour by accommodating the pretensions of the adverse parties to give permanency to this government, and prevent that anarchy which threatened to arise from this hostile attack, and, the necessary result of anarchy, the destruction of the king: we refuse to interfere; we decline, though solicited, to take any measure to prevent this anarchy, and we suffer it to take place, with its unavoidable consequence, the death of the king; and then make this anarchy, which we refused to prevent, a pretence for joining in the hostile attack, and thereby perpetuate the evils we ought to have prevented; and now avenge the death of the king of France, though we declined taking any measures for his preservation. If to interfere in the government of neighbouring states be a right, it is also a duty; because it must be incumbent on us

to exercise it on proper occasions, and not merely as caprice or interest may suggest. Grotius in 20th cap. of his 2d book, where, on the authority of *Hercules*, he lays down the dangerous doctrine of one state interfering with another, seems to doubt his principle, for he observes, "*It is to be noted that those wars, which are undertaken for exacting punishment, unless the injuries be very great, very manifest, or backed with some other cause, are always suspected to be unjust.*" How much more than suspected, must it be, when, though requested, we have declined to prevent the evils we now pretend to punish?

So far then as it was evident that the death of the king of France would result from the government formed by the constituting assembly being subverted, and one more democratical rising in its place, so far our declining any lawful measures, which promised to give permanency to that government, constitutes us guilty of his death. And if his death resulted from errors in the limited monarchy, then, as far as our mediation might have corrected those errors, so far are we in that case accountable for the consequences.

We have not ground to say, that our acceptance of the mediation would have produced no effect; for, as the attack on France was to effect a change in their government, the submitting the dispute to mediation implied a disposition to admit of some change for the sake of peace, and we know not what concession might have been made to obtain our alliance and friendship. When all the nations of Europe armed against them, it might be wise and prudent to adopt a more democratic form of government than otherwise might have been expedient, and thus risk a temporary anarchy, in order to give an energy to the people against their foreign enemies. And though it is not to be supposed that any change which the French might have adopted, even had it been an exact copy of the English constitution, would have much reconciled the Austrian, Prussian, or Russian monarchs; yet had they found that the government of France had our cordial approbation, and they had no hopes of our assistance in subverting it, we may reasonably imagine they would not have been very ready to disturb it.

Argumentum
ad Verendum

N.

As in endeavouring to prevent the late *convulsions* in France, we should have had the greatest prospect of success, so it is equally evident that to avenge them is totally impracticable. Supposing us to meet with success equal to our most sanguine wishes; admitting, that according to Mr. Burke's directions, we wage eternal war, desolate France, and lay Paris in ruins; will our sword in this wide devastation discriminate the innocent from the guilty? Alas! it must be the innocent, chiefly, on whom our vengeance will fall. Was the death of the king perpetrated by a faction who have usurped the authority? or, have certain miserable philosophers, by their speculations, produced this melancholy scene? Will our vengeance select this faction, or these philosophers for punishment? Before our armies shall have entered France, the national assembly that voted the death of the king will be dissolved, and we shall be carrying on a war against another government, which may possibly deplore that event equally with ourselves. The impossibility of punishing the real criminals, manifests the absurdity of attempting to punish crimes by a war, and proves that such a war must in its nature be unjust.

Conscious of this, many contend that the death of the king is not the cause of the war, but that it results solely from the national aggressions of France. But this cannot be admitted, when we consider that it constitutes the principal part of those invectives which have been delivered in the Senate to prompt us to a war; that it was brought before it by the king himself; and that immediately on the news of the fact being perpetrated, the French minister was forbid the kingdom, and the royal message for a war armament delivered. From these circumstances we may rather infer that it is this event which has actually precipitated us into a war, not that we are to imagine it to be the real motive; Lord Aukland's memorial, states, that the French government had given us umbrage from the beginning, but it was not til this event took place, that the war appears to have been resolved on, however much it might by some have been desired.

As punishing nations by war is unjust from the consideration of its confounding the innocent with the

guilty, it is no less so from its being totally destitute of the essential property of punishment, *the prevention of future crimes*; because, there is no system of laws by which the punishment is regulated, nor any jurisdiction whose authority is recognized. The Prince of Orange did not undertake his expedition, because it was consonant to any law which had been sanctioned by the monarchs of Europe, nor was he deterred from it because Monmouth and his adherents had been severely punished for similar attempts. Those, who, in governing nations, or commanding armies, perpetrate crimes;—those who assume, or subvert dominion, do so in consequence of the power they possess; and those who are concerned in any revolt, will govern themselves merely on the circumstances of that, in which they are engaged, and not of any prior one. The national convention were not deterred from executing the king, because the murderers of Charles the first were brought to the scaffold; and should we be able to select the persons concerned in the death of the French king, and punish them, it does not follow, that those who in future may have the disposal of kings, will treat them with greater lenity. The severity with which James the second treated his nephew, Monmouth, did not occasion his daughters to manifest any great tenderness to the deposed monarch; nor did the severe punishment inflicted on the murderers of some of the Scottish kings, prevent twelve of them from being killed in succession.

If, however we be determined to take cognizance of this crime, notwithstanding we can be authorized by no principle whatever, and though our threatened vengeance can be productive of no future good, even to kings themselves.—If we do assume the judgment seat, it behoves us to conduct ourselves, becoming the important situation in which we have placed ourselves; and more peculiarly so, as our conduct bears a most suspicious aspect. Why, it may be asked, is this single, solitary crime, particularly selected as the sole object of our indignation?—Attend—Lord Grenville replies—
*"The recent transaction at Paris has filled all Europe
 "with amazement and horror, and has been received in
 "this country with a degree of feeling and emotion that
 "makes me glory in being an Englishman."*—Indeed!

happy news, that there is such a paucity of crimes in the world, that the attention of all Europe should be so totally engrossed by one. Happy, happy nations of Europe! whose diversified forms of government and multifarious systems of laws are all so admirably adapted to secure human felicity, insure the safety of mankind, and prevent the commission of crimes, that they are thus so universally struck with *horror and amazement* at this single offence, perpetrated in a foreign jurisdiction. The empress of Russia, who, I presume stands foremost, almost petrified with astonishment at the murder of a king, cannot, I dare say, find through all her wide extended territories, one act of injustice, one scene of misery, that can be produced as a counter-part.

Not in the least meaning to dispute this universal justice, this exemption from crime, which pervades the empires of Russia and Germany, and which has made it requisite for the happy subjects of those empires to extend their views to Paris for an object to excite their *amazement* and their *horror*; yet may the propriety of the people of this country joining in it admit of some consideration.

It might indeed possibly be doubted whether our own virtue were not rather a more rational ground of glory, than any *emotion* or any *feeling* respecting the crimes of others. It must indeed be acknowledged, that to express the warmest emotions, and the most indignant feelings against *them*, is a far easier task than to pursue the thorny path of virtue, and steadily resist the temptations to which we are exposed. Thus we execrate an Inkle, and we sob and sigh at the tragedy of Oroonoko; yet we could not only perpetrate the facts themselves, but, through every revolving hour from age to age, we can realize the scenes, and re-act them on the wide theatre of the world, for the sake of gratifying our appetite with a despicable luxury. Let it then be asked, if we have no other, no clearer evidence of our purity, than our amazement and our horror, our feeling and our emotion, on the death of the king of France.

The extent of our conquests surpasses those of Cæsar and of Alexander; and cannot those wide extended dominions be appealed to, as proofs of the moderation

NB!

Despoticism
and
Inhumanity.

with which we exercise power, the firmness with which we resist every temptation of oppression and injustice, the sacredness with which we regard the lives and property of those who are at our mercy, and the vigilance with which we protect the innocent? If not, "*our most marked and animated indignation at a late transaction at Paris,*" instead of being our glory, will prove us to be mean, as we are vile, base as we are criminal. It will prove we possess the despicable art of a prostitute, who attempts to conceal her deviations from the path of virtue, by invectives on the unchastity of others. Is there then, through these vast dominions, no evil to be found of equal magnitude to the murder of the king of France? Has no crime been perpetrated that calls for our swift vengeance, that we are thus necessitated to go into other jurisdictions, to traverse foreign countries, in search of criminals? Are there none equal to the national convention, and the mob of Paris to be found among those who are under our protection, and subject to our authority? Alas! were the French to seize all the kings and queens, and emperors and empresses, and clergy, and nobles of the continent of Europe, and involve them all in one general carnage, dreadfully, monstrous, as might be the deed, it would sink beneath our notice, were it compared with those scenes which the West-india islands present to our view. + Lord Grenville, perhaps, will glory in being an Englishman, when he compares the slow, the solemn, the cautious deliberation, with which that body, who now possesses Mr. Burke's hyperbolic praises, conduct the proceedings respecting those enormities of which we ourselves are guilty, with the promptitude and ardor with which they can express their *marked and animated indignation* at the crimes of others. Infinite is the difference, it seems, between forming a judgment of other peoples conduct and our own. No sooner are they told of the death of the king of France, than instantly they can resolve, "*that it was an atrocious act which must be viewed by every nation of Europe as an outrage of religion, justice, and humanity.*" And can as instantly resolve to assure his majesty, "*That impressed with these sentiments, they will enable his majesty to augment his forces, to act as circumstances may require*"

AB!! "at such an important juncture." But it seems they have not leisure to prosecute the inquiry any farther on the Slave Trade, because they are so extremely busy in pouring out vengeance on the murderers of the king of France.

Well! but I am told, the crimes to which I allude are common ordinary offences, but at Paris a *King* has been murdered. "*An innocent monarch has been sacrificed in violation of every principle of justice.*"—When I see a man unjustly deprived by his fellow mortals, of that life which his Creator gave, and which he alone has a right to take away, I indeed see a tremendous sight, and it were to be wished that it were an event as uncommon as it is awful. But if we be called on to pronounce the murder of the king of France, "*to be an atrocious scene, unparalleled in the annals of the world.*"—We must then demand, what are the peculiar circumstances attending it? *The being deprived of life unjustly* is a general definition of murder. But I am again reminded that it is a *King*, and not an African, but a *European* monarch, whose loss we deplore. True, but I know not that impartial justice will much consider that the human form is wrapped in purple, or that the brow is encircled with a diadem. I am indeed ready to admit, that in addition to the crime of murder, which every unjust privation of life implies, there may attach circumstances of additional criminality, and that additional criminality may arise among other circumstances, from the situation in which the murdered person was placed. But merely his being an *innocent King*, will not raise it above the ordinary level of those murders which occur every hour of the day in our West-india islands, and in the holds of our Corsairs. * The former government of France, in which Mr. Burke says they might glory, perpetrated thousands of murders far more atrocious than the murder of the king of France, supposing him to have been innocent. But it may be remarked that from the nature of royalty the crimes of kings must be extremely equivocal. Actions may be deemed innocent by them, merely because they are such as other monarchs have committed, or because the laws of the country had not recognized the crimes of kings, yet may their subjects justly deem them criminal.

* *W. G. Guinea Slave Ships; for a description of which see the Evidence laid before the House*

When Lord Grenville tells us that "*this innocent monarch has been cruelly murdered by a self-constituted power, without having violated any existing law, contrary to every principle of justice, for that his judges were parties in the cause, they were legislators, accusers, judges, and jurors.*" He says no more than must necessarily be true of every suffering monarch. In *this kingdom, in the space of about 800 years, upwards of thirty kings and queens have been killed, besides dethronements, banishments, proscriptions, sentences of bastardy, &c.* Now will Lord Grenville give us an account of the regular processes against them? Will he favor us with an account of the parties, the accusers, the judges, and the jurors? Will he shew that the BRAVE, MAGNANIMOUS, JUST, LIBERAL, and HUMANE people of this island have proceeded in any *one* case, more consonantly to existing laws, and the principles of justice, than the people of *France* have against the deceased king?

When calamities fall on *monarchs*; so far from its exciting our *amazement* and *astonishment*, we might rather consider them as being from their situation, most peculiarly exposed to *violence* and *injustice*. If seated on their thrones by power, when that power fails them, they must necessarily become the most forlorn, and most helpless of the human race: no laws to which they can appeal: no judicature to grant them redress: no sanctuary they can depend upon for refuge. If they have the misfortune to escape a speedy termination of their woes by death, they become the sport of fortune, a wandering or a degraded spectacle, insulted and trampled on in their misery.

If then those experiments in government, which are going forward in the world, should at length prove that the government of nations, the preservation of property, the benefit of society, do not absolutely require a *regal order*. If no great injury would result to mankind from its abolition, it might then possibly become a question, not unworthy consideration; *whether it be compatible with humanity, to dress out the gaudy trappings of a throne, to ensnare our fellow creatures; thus tempting them to ascend a dangerous eminence, from whence to be precipitated, must be calamitous, in proportion to the extent of the power they possessed, and the splendor and the adulation with which they had been surrounded.—FINIS.*

When Lord Curzon's letter is read, it is found that the Government have been very much surprised at the result of the inquiry, and that they are now in a position to take more effective measures for the improvement of the Indian railways. The letter also contains a list of the various defects which have been pointed out by the committee, and a statement of the steps which have been taken to remedy them. It is a very interesting and important document, and one which should be read by all those who are interested in the progress of the Indian railways.

